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I.
Law professors love to talk about themselves.  Rarely is this more evident
than when they have a student audience.  It is surprising, therefore, that only
now has a full-time legal scholar, dedicated primarily to matters other than the
topic of writing itself, produced an entire book of advice for the student
scholar.  In Academic Legal Writing:  Law Review Articles, Student Notes, and
Seminar Papers, Eugene Volokh, who teaches the law of the First
Amendment, copyright law, and firearms regulation policy at the UCLA
School of Law, has delivered an engaging, witty, and extremely useful book
for the aspiring student note and article writer that is based, it clearly appears,
on the model of scholarship that Volokh himself has so successfully pursued.
As teachers of legal writing know, the marketplace already features an
engaging, witty, and entirely useful book for student scholars, Scholarly
Writing for Law Students:  Seminar Papers, Law Review Notes and Law
Review Competition Papers, by Elizabeth Fajans and Mary Falk.1  This short
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PAPERS, LAW REVIEW NOTES AND LAW REVIEW COMPETITION PAPERS (2d ed. 2000).
2. During the last decade, much of the emphasis on clinical and other practical lawyering skills
training can be traced to a report produced by the American Bar Association.  See TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:  NARROWING THE GAP, STATEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL LAWYERING SKILLS
AND PROFESSIONAL VALUES (American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, 1992) (commonly referred to as the “MacCrate Report” after the chair of the Task Force, Robert
MacCrate).
Review first takes up the differences between Volokh’s volume and that of
Fajans and Falk, and between Volokh and the other sources of instruction for
the student scholar.  Those differences, including a brief critique of Volokh’s
book itself, take up Parts II, III, and IV below.
The key distinction, it seems to me, is that Volokh approaches the topic
as a question of producing competent—even strong—scholarship, whereas his
predecessors in the field looked at it as a question of producing
competent—even strong—critical writing as part of the overall legal
educational enterprise.  The difference is more than one of degree.  Part V
argues that helpful as the book is for students and scholars both—and it is
extremely helpful—Academic Legal Writing makes an implicit, highly
intriguing argument about the current character of legal education and, by
extension, the legal profession.  Law schools should focus more explicitly on
student scholarship and thus do more to foster a genuinely scholarly culture
among their students as well as their faculties, and ultimately among all
members of the profession.  Academic Legal Writing is therefore both useful
(as a teaching tool), and sly (as a commentary on the profession).  In teaching
law students to be scholars, it is opening a discussion about the role of
scholarship in the legal curriculum as a whole and, by implication, on the
scholarly characteristics that all lawyers should be expected to possess and
display.  In an era when clinical and other “skills” training has become more
and more the focus of legal education,2 such a discussion may seem
anachronistic.  To the contrary:  Academic Legal Writing rightly suggests that
it is both important, and timely.
II.
Those who teach and otherwise think about scholarship for law students
work with a small canon.  Until now, the only text in the field came from
Professors Fajans and Falk, who both teach legal writing at Brooklyn Law
School.  In addition, two nationally-known scholars who work primarily
outside the field of legal writing, Richard Delgado and Pamela Samuelson,
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Samuelson, Good Legal Writing:  Of Orwell and Window Panes, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 149 (1984).
4. See FAJANS & FALK, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 5.  In other work, the authors have explained at greater length how their approach to critical
writing fits into broader pedagogical goals.  See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Comments Worth
Making:  Supervising Scholarly Writing in Law School, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 344 (1996); Elizabeth
Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase:  Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
163, 187 (1993).
7. See FAJANS & FALK, supra note 1, at 25-26.
have produced essays on scholarly writing that are widely cited by teachers of
legal writing.3  Understanding Volokh’s contribution requires briefly
summarizing this literature.
A.  Scholarly Writing for Law Students
As teachers and practitioners of good legal writing, Fajans and Falk set
their agenda on the table in their first few paragraphs:  “Whether you are
writing a competition paper, seminar paper, or law review article, this book
can help you make the necessary transition from instrumental to critical
writing.”4  Scholarly writing is an important theme of the book, but the authors
are more concerned with instilling methods for the production of the work
product—“strategies and techniques for each stage of the writing process, from
inspiration to final proofreading”5—than with the quality of the substantive
research and analysis that results.  Not that the results do not count; they do.
But the writing process is first and foremost an important element of each
student’s overall training as a lawyer:
You will find that the techniques and strategies of critical thinking, reading, and writing
that this book describes—for finding inspiration, drafting, revising, editing, and
polishing—are as useful for a complex estate plan, office memorandum, or appellate
brief as they are essential to your paper.  In fact, a recent study shows that former
members value the law review experience at least as much for its enhancement of their
writing skills as for its enhancement of their resumes.6
Fajans and Falk cite Aristotle’s Rhetoric (following the steps of definition,
comparison, causation, and substantiation) as a model for thinking about and
organizing a topic and ultimately, a paper.7  The book walks the student
through what might be called an Aristotelian analytic and writing process:
selecting a topic and choosing a thesis; researching the material; the mechanics
of organizing, writing, and re-writing; footnoting and using authority wisely
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8. See id. at 185.
9. See Delgado, supra note 3.
10. See, e.g., FAJANS & FALK, supra note 1, at 7, 27.
11. EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING:  LAW REVIEW ARTICLES, STUDENT NOTES AND
SEMINAR PAPERS 6 (2003).
12. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 446-48.
13. Id. at 448.
(and ethically); and going through the editing process.  In short, Scholarly
Writing for Law Students is a detailed, soup-to-nuts manual for preparing a
piece of critical writing.  Publication and recognition are welcome rewards, but
they follow rather than guide the process of research and writing.  The
concluding chapter on “Getting Mileage:  Winning Awards and Publishing
Your Work” begins:  “Although a job well done is its own satisfaction,
imagine how good it would feel to publish your paper or win a national writing
competition prize.”8
B.  How to Write a Law Review Article
Richard Delgado’s 1986 essay, How to Write a Law Review Article,9 is not
addressed only to law students, but its clarity and brevity make it an ideal
resource for student writers.  Fajans and Falk cite to it.10  Volokh includes it,
along with Fajans and Falk and Pamela Samuelson’s essay, as one of three
particularly useful resources for student scholars.11
Delgado’s most important discussions are his review of the types of law
review articles, and a description of the process of identifying and selecting
article topics.  (He covers researching, writing, submission, and editing in
briefer passages.)  There are, he suggests, at least ten different types of articles:
(i) the “case cruncher,” which analyzes a confused area of caselaw; (ii) the law
reform article, which proposes to reform an unfair or inequitable rule or result;
(iii) the legislative note, analyzing enacted or proposed legislation; (iv) the
interdisciplinary article, applying insights to law from some other field; (v) the
theory-fitting article, which identifies a new, emergent theory or principle in
the law; (vi) a discussion of the forms and institutions of lawyers and the legal
profession; (vii) a continuation of ongoing scholarly debates; (viii) pieces on
legal history; (ix) the casenote; and (x) the empirical research article.12  To find
a topic within one of those paradigms, “find one new point, one new insight,
one new way of looking at a piece of law, and organize your entire article
around that.  One insight from another discipline, one application of simple
logic to a problem where it has never been made before is all you need.”13  The
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14. Id. at 452.
15. See JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY 3 (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press
1996) (1852).
16.  Samuelson, supra note 3.
advice and analysis are right on target.  Yet the very brevity of the essay limits
its value as a system for producing scholarship.
Instead, as much as Fajans and Falk offer a manual for critical writing and
thinking, Delgado offers a resource for conceptualizing scholarship.  His essay
takes up only nine pages in all, and his descriptions of article varieties and
topic selection occupy four of those.  Discussions of research and the use of
authority take up a page and a half.  The writing process itself takes up only
a single paragraph.14  What counts in this universe, then, is not the training in
analytic skills that (legal) scholars endure and acquire.  What counts is the
production of what John Henry Newman, the intellectual ancestor of the
“liberal education” that is the rhetorical cornerstone of American higher
education, characterized as fundamental to the character of a university:
scholarship as the advancement of knowledge.15  Delgado differs from Fajans
and Falk in focusing on the substantive end, rather than on the analytic means.
For the latter, the hard work of scholarship lies in the analytic process, and
often in that portion of the process that precedes writing itself.  The mechanics
of putting words on paper (or in bits) may be a secondary matter.  For
Delgado, there is no doubt that the battle may be won or lost in the analysis,
but the battle means little if the product is unworthy, and the state of
knowledge remains unchanged.
C.  Good Legal Writing:  Of Orwell and Window Panes
Pamela Samuelson’s essay, Good Legal Writing:  Of Orwell and Window
Panes,16 tries to bridge some of the gap between student-writing-as-extended-
critical-thinking-skills, on the one hand, and scholarship-as-advancement-of-
knowledge, on the other.  Her essay is addressed primarily to law students.  It
offers neither a manual for successful critical writing (again, unlike Fajans and
Falk), nor a conceptual framework for understanding what makes an effective
scholarly article (unlike Delgado).  Samuelson offers a collection of tips and
recommendations, to be borrowed and mixed as the reader most prefers.  There
are the six “paramount” rules of good legal writing:  (i) have a point; (ii) get
to the point; (iii) adopt an effective structure; (iv) break the analysis into
independently supported components; (v) proceed in a measured tone; (vi) and
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17. Id. at 151-57.
18. Id. at 157-59.
19. Id. at 163-64.
20. Id. at 164-66.
21. Id. at 159-63.
22. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at v.
23. Compare Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026
(2003), with Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161
(2000).
24. In part, this is no surprise.  Volokh’s mentor is Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, no slouch himself when it comes to the written word.
25. The similarities may simply be due to the nature of the material, since both books essentially
follow the scholar from beginning to end of the researching, writing and publishing processes.
be concrete.17  These are conceptual enough to be both familiar and useful to
non-student scholars, but sufficiently scripted to be comprehensible to
students.  There are supplemental rules, which range from mechanics of
writing (write a strong introduction; use effective section titles; make case
discussions brief and to the point)18 to substantive analysis (present balanced
perspectives; consider policy implications of the thesis).19  Samuelson includes
useful discussions of research strategies (learning how to do enough
research),20 and writing mechanics.21  Her prescriptions are refreshingly down
to earth.  Like Delgado, she offers a scholar’s perspective on what makes
effective scholarship.
III.
Into this field comes Volokh’s Academic Legal Writing.  Eugene Volokh
is a precocious and prolific scholar of constitutional law and related subjects,
not a teacher or scholar of legal writing.  In a relatively short time (he has been
a member of the UCLA faculty only since 1994) he has authored or co-
authored more than thirty law review articles.22  These embrace an impressive
range of substantive topics.23  Equally important for present purposes, he
displays a command of clear, readable prose that is unusual in legal
scholarship.24  His advice on producing good scholarship, whether delivered
to students or fellow academics, is well worth considering, even given the
useful work described above.
Volokh’s contribution, however, is more than merely that of an earnest
scholar and good writer.  Academic Legal Writing is notable both for what it
does and for what it does not do.  What it does is combine the “manual”
approach of Scholarly Writing for Law Students (even going so far, in places,
as to share some organizational similarities),25 with the primary concern for the
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Characterizing Scholarly Writing for Law Students as a sort of “manual” is not intended to diminish that
work itself as a principled implementation of composition theory.  Cf. Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards
the Millennium:  The Law School, the Research University, and the Professional Reforms of Legal
Education, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1965, 1988 (1999) (urging evaluation of law school writing according to
principles of composition theory-writing as a process, and writing as a social act).
26. Compare VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 9-57, with FAJANS & FALK, supra note 1, at 1-49.  Volokh
follows this section with a brief, discrete section devoted to differences between scholarly works and
seminar papers.  See VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 59-67.
27. Compare VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 63-67, with FAJANS & FALK, supra note 1, at 51-62.
28. Compare VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 69-94, with FAJANS & FALK, supra note 1, at 63-104.
Fajans and Falk discuss writing techniques in two sections, on outlining, drafting, and revising, see FAJANS
& FALK, supra note 1, at 63-104, and separately on grammar, syntax, and punctuation.  See id. at 121-61.
29. Compare VOLOKH supra note 11, at 95-131 (discussing the use of evidence), with FAJANS &
FALK, supra note 1, at 105-120 (discussing the appropriate use of footnotes).
30. Compare VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 133-35, with FAJANS & FALK, supra note 1, at 163-84.
31. Compare VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 137-54, with FAJANS & FALK, supra note 1, at 185-88.
32. See VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 9 (acknowledging debt to Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure
scholarly content of the writer’s output that characterizes Delgado’s and
Samuelson’s essays.  This is a neat trick, and it is made possible by Volokh’s
willingness in effect to use his book to describe how he conducts his own
scholarship.  Academic Legal Writing is not merely or mostly a guidebook for
student scholars, or for legal scholars generally.  It is a how-to book for
writing and publishing as successfully as Volokh himself has done.  What
Academic Legal Writing does not do is equally important, and it derives
entirely from Volokh’s focus on the production of high quality scholarship as
an end in itself.  Academic Legal Writing is not a book about how to use legal
scholarship to become a better lawyer, directed primarily to the occasional law
review editor or other student who cares to take the time to produce real
scholarship.  It is a book that argues that all law students, and thus all lawyers,
should become better scholars.
Such a book cannot appear to be about scholarship; in order to be
marketable, it must appear to be about writing.  The book thus borrows its
overall organizational framework, wisely, from Scholarly Writing for Law
Students.  First are the basics of identifying a topic and converting that topic
into a worthy article, note, or seminar paper.26  Next is research,27 then writing
and editing.28  The proper interpretation and use of authority follow.29  Volokh,
like Fajans and Falk, concludes with chapters on editing others’ work,30 and
on publishing one’s work.31
The organization and presentation may be familiar, but Volokh’s tone and
overall orientation could not be more different.  His concept of useful
scholarship is borrowed not from Aristotelian rhetoric, but from Stephen
Carter’s patent law metaphor,32 which Carter himself invoked as an elaboration
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and “White Male” Standards:  Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065, 2082-84 (1991)).
33. See Carter, supra note 32, at 2084.
34. In theme Volokh thus resists the dominant trend in the reformation of legal writing curricula of
recent years, away from a “product approach” and toward a “process approach.”  See Jo Anne Durako et al.,
From Product to Process:  Evolution of a Legal Writing Program, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 719 (1997).
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (stating that “[t]he [patent] specification shall conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention”).
36. See id. § 102 (defining novelty for patentability purposes).
37. See id. § 103 (defining non-obviousness as measured from the perspective of “a person having
ordinary skill in the art”).
38. See id. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
39. “Soundness” is the scholarly equivalent of the patent statute’s requirement that the invention be
properly “enabled” in the patent application, that is, that the application demonstrate that the inventor has
in fact invented the thing that is claimed.  See id. § 112.
40. See VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 9-13.
41. Id. at 12.
42. Id. at 13.  Non-obviousness may be demonstrated by nuance.  See id. at 14.  In patent law, the
inventor need not demonstrate a “flash of genius.”  “Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.”  35 U.S.C. § 103.
43. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 14-15.
of the scholarship-as-advancement-of-knowledge premise.33  It is the result,
not the process, that counts.34  Like a valid patent, a worthwhile piece of legal
scholarship, regardless of the professional status of its author, should make
(i) a claim,35 that is (ii) novel,36 (iii) nonobvious,37 (iv) useful,38 and
(v) sound.39
In separate sections, Volokh elaborates on each point.  Claim:  The piece
should have a thesis, which might be descriptive, prescriptive, or some
combination of both, and in any case should be reducible to a single
sentence.40  But the thesis is not merely an excuse for hanging the scholar’s
hat.  “Remember that your goal is to find whatever problem will yield the best
article.”41  Novelty:  No one must have come up with this claim before.  “It’s
not enough for your ideas to be original to you, in the sense that you came up
with them on your own—the article must add something to the state of expert
knowledge about the field.”42  Nonobvious:  Not anyone could have come up
with the claim.  “Keep in mind that your article will generally be read by smart
and often slightly arrogant readers (your professor, the law review editors,
other people working in the field) who will be tempted to say, ‘well, I could
have thought of that if I’d only taken fifteen minutes’—even when that’s not
quite true.”43  Useful:  This is a criterion that may be honored by the scholarly
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44. Compare Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (illustrating judicial lament regarding production of “impractical”
legal scholarship), with Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship,
91 MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1928 (1993) (defending the academy and characterizing legal scholarship, and
interdisciplinary scholarship in particular, as a high-risk, low return activity).
45. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 17; cf. Judge Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal
Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295 (2000) (encouraging stronger ties between legal academics and judges).
46. See VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 19-28.
47.  Id. at 34.
48. Id.
community more in the breach than in the observance.44  Nonetheless, a valid
piece of scholarship must, at least formally, advance the state of the art.
“[C]laims that call for modest changes to current doctrine tend to be more
useful than radical claims, especially in articles by students or by junior
practitioners.”45  Sound:  Volokh suggests that authors use “test suites,” a
concept borrowed from computer software design, running an article’s
proposals against a variety of hypothetical scenarios to determine whether they
produce sound results.  If the results are unsound or unexpected in any of a
number of ways (Volokh catalogs the most common problems), the article can
be revised accordingly.46  What the author claims to have “invented” must in
fact work as promised.  If it doesn’t (typically, because the article is so broad
as to be impracticable in practice, or so narrow as to be useless to all but a
handful of readers), the article doesn’t deserve the reward of scholarly
recognition and should be re-worked until it does.
The balance of the book elaborates this core structure.  The scholarly
article should be organized in order to frame the problem that it analyzes
clearly and quickly, and to review the background of the problem succinctly.
“Your claim and your proof are what you’re adding to the field of knowledge;
your achievement will be measured largely by this value added.  You can’t
prove your claim without explaining the background facts and doctrine, but do
this as tersely as possible.”47  The bulk of the article should be dedicated to
proving the claim itself.  “Too many student articles spend eighty percent of
their time summarizing the law and twenty percent explaining and proving
their claims.”48
In this portion of Academic Legal Writing, Volokh makes perhaps his
most important contribution to the literature on critical legal writing itself.  He
dedicates several sections to both conceptual and practical approaches to
conducting the hard work of legal analysis.  This is a step that Delgado and
Fajans and Falk mostly omit, possibly because the task of explaining it is at
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49. See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 152-55 (recommending that students connect doctrinal analysis
to policy analysis, that students avoid abstraction, and that students engage in balanced analysis).
50. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 35-43.
51. See id. at 20.
52. Id. at 79-92.
53. Id. at 155-61.
54. See FAJANS & FALK, supra note 1, at 121-61.
55. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 111-28, 160-61.
least as difficult as actually engaging in it.  Samuelson refers to it briefly.49  It
is a step, however, that many students find almost mystical in its complexity.
By way of showing how the author should prove the claim, Professor Volokh
walks through a lengthy series of hurdles to confront and overcome:  proving
the claim doctrinally and as a matter of policy; doing so concretely and with
examples; and explaining and extending the claim through additional layers
of debate and other areas of law and policy.50
All of this is accomplished with both enough explanation to guide a
novice and enough sophistication to serve a published scholar.  Volokh’s
fleshing out of the patent metaphor, supported by the additional “test suite”
metaphor for proving the internal validity of the author’s analysis, is calculated
to produce thoughtful but robust scholarship, provocative where appropriate
but supported by clear analysis.  Volokh never comes right out and says that
this is the model that he follows himself, but that point is implicit.  His “test
suite” metaphor is explicitly based on his own experience as a computer
programmer, for example.51  From beginning to end, this is a model that
deserves the attention of all legal scholars, not merely the attention of their
students.
IV.
That said, the “writer’s manual for scholars” approach of Academic Legal
Writing has some drawbacks.  They are minor, given the overall strength of the
book, but they are worth brief comment.
First, Volokh’s comprehensive approach to the material all but requires
that he devote large sections of the book to explanations and recommendations
regarding grammar, syntax, writing style,52 and ethical issues in research and
writing.53  Fajans and Falk do likewise,54 though Volokh’s emphases differ
here and there, particularly in his lengthy explanation of the importance of
understanding statistical and empirical data, and its ethical use.55  The need to
package this material in a single volume is understandable, given the
reluctance of law school faculty to demand that their students read more than
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56. See, e.g., LINDA HOLDEMAN EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING:  PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND
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the demise of the Critical Legal Studies Movement.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About
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(2001) (evaluating Charles Lawrence’s contribution to Critical Race Theory); A. Michael Froomkin,
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economics literature has had a profound influence on law and legal scholarship.  See Richard A. Epstein,
Let “The Fundamental Things Apply”:  Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1288, 1304-10 (2002) (describing key insights from economic theory that have become relevant to
legal scholars).  The normative influence of these disciplines is controversial.  See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr.,
Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 907-11 (2002) (decrying
reliance on excessively formalist and relativist theories and advocating return to practicing legal reasoning).
59. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 98-99, 104-05, 109-20.
one book on writing well.  But there are many other good, even better books
out there on how to compose high quality non-fiction, both in the context of
legal writing56 and otherwise.57
Second, aside from an important, detailed discussion of the role of
empirical evidence, Volokh devotes an insufficient amount of space to
possibilities for interdisciplinary and other nontraditional forms of legal
scholarship.  The emergence of high quality interdisciplinary work by legal
scholars is one of the most remarkable and valuable developments in law
schools over the last twenty years,58 and there is every reason to think that law
students can appreciate its strengths and weaknesses and produce such
scholarship of their own.  Academic Legal Writing talks explicitly (and to its
credit, at length) about the source of one type of interdisciplinary scholarship,
work based on statistical and other empirical evidence.59  It contains little
advice, however, for the student or other scholar who wants to explore
different sorts of interdisciplinary work.
Third, and most important (though again dictated, perhaps, by
considerations of the market for such books—most students produce at most
a single scholarly paper over the course of their law school careers), Academic
Legal Writing omits much consideration of perhaps the most important non-
analytic dimension of the tasks of scholarship:  engaging with and even
participating in a community of scholars and of scholarship.  Volokh covers
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60. Id. at 72-73.
61. Id. at 150-53.
62. See Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk:  Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40
DUQ. L. REV. 489, 506-21 (2002); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing:  A Revised
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63. Volokh’s book could do so from the perspective of the scholar.  It seems to me that a counterpart
argument, for the extension of the scholarly community to include students, could be made from the
perspective of the law school and its faculty.  For example, law students could sponsor colloquia for student
scholarship, and/or law schools could include students in faculty colloquia or workshops.  If Volokh is
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the necessary dynamics of preparing drafts and responding to feedback from
professors.60  He also includes some valuable advice for the soon-to-be
published author on placing articles for publication, working with editors, and
on promoting articles within the scholarly community.61  (Again, as with much
of the book, faculty as well as students should take heed.)  His case that
student scholarship should focus on authentic scholarly output would be made
stronger still by elaborating on scholarly discourse itself.  Teachers of non-
scholarly legal writing have begun to incorporate thinking about discourse
communities into their work.62  Scholars in both law and other fields
understand intuitively that effective scholarship can be produced only by
understanding the scholarly community itself—the established norms and
conventions of existing scholarship, the history and expectations of the field,
its population of scholars, and so forth.  The “advancement of knowledge” that
marks scholarship necessarily takes place against this background.  Volokh
covers some of this in sections on identifying a worthy scholarly project, that
is, is the topic novel, useful, and sound?  The importance of the scholarly
community continues even when the writing is complete, as non-student
scholars learn quickly.  There are drafts to acquire and drafts to circulate,
contacts to cultivate, presentations to hear and to give, and perspectives to be
shared.  A scholarly work responds to and is a contribution to a dialogue with
other scholars.  Academic Legal Writing would benefit from more emphasis
on the importance of becoming part of that dialogue and on techniques for
doing so.63
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V.
The broader question here is whether a book such as this (or, for that
matter, the competing volume by Fajans and Falk) is necessary at all.  Clearly,
Volokh thinks so, and I tend to agree.  The reasons are worth exploring,
however, because they bear on what it is that law schools should be teaching
their students.  By extension, the reasons bear on what lawyers should be
learning and doing, and ultimately on what it is that should define the legal
profession today.
Why write?  More specifically, why do law students write, and why
should they write?  Law students are required to write, according to
accreditation standards for law schools.  The American Bar Association
(“ABA”) requires that “[a]ll students in a J.D. program shall receive:
(2) substantial legal writing instruction, including at least one rigorous writing
experience in the first year and at least one additional rigorous writing
experience after the first year.”64  The Bylaws of the American Association of
Law Schools (“AALS”) include the requirement that “[a] member school shall
. . . assure that every student receives significant instruction in legal writing
and research.”65  The standards do not define “rigorous” and the Bylaws do not
define “significant,” leaving substantial discretion in the hands of individual
faculties and faculty members.66  But virtually all American law schools
provide some basic training in legal research and writing during the first year
(often focusing on preparation of office memoranda and appellate briefs), and
most require that each graduating student complete at least one significant
writing project.  Writing and drafting, after all, is at the core of almost all types
of law practice, so it is fitting that the lawyer’s professional training include
some practice with this essential skill.  But it is hardly a given that law
students will be exposed to, let alone be required to prepare, significant
scholarly work.
Legal scholarship by students, as such, occupies an awkward position in
this matrix.  Few law schools or law professors consider scholarly writing a
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necessary part of the “rigorous” or “significant” instruction in writing that the
ABA and AALS expect; few expect scholarship from students other than those
who undertake to write for law reviews; few work with students on the joint
production of scholarship.  None of this is surprising.  There are few
professional rewards for the law professor who demands that his or her
students produce true scholarship rather than mere seminar papers.  There are
few reasons for students to demand to learn scholarly skills.  Few lawyers have
any professional need to produce law review articles.  Outside of a handful of
elite law schools, few law students intend to become legal professors and
therefore need or want to learn the craft of scholarship.67
It is possible, then, that Volokh is addressing Academic Legal Writing to
the relatively small constituency of law students who aspire to the
professoriate, or who otherwise value the abstract, intellectual life of the law
for its own sake and want to pursue that interest in written form.  My reading
of this book, however, is that Volokh has not framed so narrow an argument.
I suspect that he has a different answer for those who ask, why should law
students write?  That answer, and it is a provocative one, is that it is part of the
lawyer’s job, part of the professional role, to acquire and display critical,
analytic skills in service both to the law and to society, and not just to the
individual client.  Scholarship is too important, in other words, to leave it to
scholars themselves.
Nowhere does Volokh make this claim directly.  It may be a little
speculative for me to infer the claim from his text.  But why else focus so
strongly on the classic characteristics of scholarship as such, rather than only
on the analytic training that extended research supplies?  And why else devote
so much space to publication and promotion, when, as Fajans and Falk argue,
those tasks are effectively secondary to most students, if they consider
publication at all?68
Whether the claim is present explicitly or not, the claim is part of an
argument well worth making, and worth exploring at some greater length.  It
extends to its logical conclusion a debate—what does legal scholarship consist
of, and what is the proper role of scholarship within the legal
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profession?—that remains unresolved even among law professors, addressing
the norms of their own part of the profession.69  If I am correct that Volokh’s
book is based on this premise, then he deserves credit for the sheer cleverness
of presenting it in the guise of a textbook.  If I am reading more into the text
than Volokh intends, then the argument ought to be made nonetheless.  The
argument, to be clear, is this.  Law students, and therefore lawyers, not only
can be scholars, but should be scholars.  Academic Legal Writing is a book not
for the niche law student, but for all law students, and ultimately, for all
lawyers.
For both financial and broader cultural reasons, law schools today live
under a pair of pressures:  the demands of a bar that expect that ever more pre-
professional training take place before students graduate,70 and the demands
of a student constituency that responds to an extraordinary degree to rankings
of the “quality” of a given law school.71  Neither of these demands is entirely
new, of course.  There has been tension for decades between the “professional”
mission of legal education and the scholarly or academic mission of law
schools.72  Law schools were formally and informally ranked, in a variety of
ways, long before 1990, when US News & World Report started publishing its
quantified statistics on student:faculty ratios, financial resources, and
reputation among the practicing bar.73  Both pressures cut decidedly against
efforts to extend the scholarly mission of the law school more broadly to its
students.  Implicit in both is the assumption that the practicing bar has little
need to be reconciled to that mission, except to the extent that legal scholarship
is “useful” in some immediate, instrumental sense, like persuading an appellate
judge that a client’s cause is deserving.74
Yet Volokh’s indirect invocation of the “advancement of knowledge”
criterion precisely evokes that scholarly mission, and couples it with the
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injunction familiar to all practicing lawyers—that scholarship should be useful.
Volokh’s implicit marrying of the dual identities of the legal profession has
deep historical roots.  Cardinal Newman, cited above as the source of the
classical definition of scholarship, went to some lengths to explain how
professional education was consistent with his liberal, humane vision of a
university.75  Why, after all, are virtually all American law schools situated
within universities?  The historian Jaroslav Pelikan, in his recent
reexamination of Newman, places law at the historic and contemporary core
of the university,76 and in so doing reminds us of the humanity that lies at the
core of the profession:
[T]o qualify as a “profession,” an occupation of activity must involve some tradition of
critical philosophical reflection, and probably the existence of a body of scholarly
literature in which such reflection has been developed and debated.  But the corollary of
that thesis is probably a definition of the university as the only possible setting in which
such reflection on a profession, and therefore the training informed by such reflection,
can be carried on in its full intellectual context—and hence also a definition of the
university that includes such training as a necessary element.77
Scholarship, in its classic sense, is inseparable from that core, and it is that
core that Volokh, I suspect, is subtly trying to capture and assert as an
obligation of student, faculty, institution—and profession.  We should train
student scholars, in other words, so that we might have lawyer-scholars.
Those lawyer-scholars should analyze and critique on behalf of society rather
than merely on behalf of their clients, in a profession whose mission it is to
advance the knowledge that constitutes the law.
This claim raises a host of important questions, about the character of
distinctively legal scholarship,78 the overall character of the legal profession
to which it relates,79 and the character of legal education,80 that are already the
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subjects of independent debates both inside and outside the academy.  Adding
students to the mix of questions about the scholarly obligations and aspirations
of lawyers and law faculty adds layers of complexity to an already crowded
field of demands on the profession and its professional schools.81  Engaging
law students more regularly in scholarly discourses is time-consuming and
expensive.  Some faculty may resist the inroads on traditional professional
hierarchies implied by bringing students more regularly into scholarly
discourses.  Others may resist spending the time required to train students in
scholarly techniques.  Clinicians may perceive a threat to curricular
innovations of recent years that have brought training in practical lawyering
skills more clearly into the regular law school curriculum.  Students may resist
the introduction of curricular requirements not narrowly focused on training
for practice, and in any case they may be poorly prepared for even
introductory scholarship by college training that itself now often suffers from
an excess of careerism.  The practicing bar is apt to dislike any shift in
emphasis that appears to make law graduates less suited for immediate
immersion in practice.
One might respond, and defend a broader role for lawyer and student
scholarship, beginning with characterizations of law as an agent of social
change, or lawyers as necessarily grounded in the ethics and morality of their
communities.82  A relevant but weaker response would rely on the notion that
scholarly legal writing is another species of legal writing, and provides yet
more training in that essential professional skill.83  Rather than make an appeal
to these contemporary (and possibly contested) norms,84 I offer, instead, the
suggestion that we revisit again the place of the legal profession—and any
profession—within the tradition of liberalism that has long characterized the
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university, including its law faculty.  Edward Levi, the former president of the
University of Chicago and Dean of its Law School, wrote:  “The professional
school which sets its course by the current practice of the profession is, in an
important sense, a failure.”85  Instead, he argued,
[t]he professional school must be concerned in a basic way with the world of learning
and the interaction between this world and the world of problems to be solved. . . .
Viewed in terms of its larger responsibilities, the professional school inherits and
exemplifies much of the disappearing tradition of the liberal arts college.86
This tradition, moreover, is neither exemplified nor transmitted to students
primarily via teaching; in the university “research properly conceived is the
highest form of education.  Without new insights and a new vision, no one can
recreate for himself or for others the great traditions of the past, understand the
cultures of today, or work with theory as a living structure.”87  Law, both
inside the academy and beyond, is not exempt from this ideal, nor merely at
its fringe.  As Pelikan observes, it was the law faculty itself that originally
defined the first university, at Bologna.88
Whether extending the premise (and promise) of legal scholarship more
broadly across the profession is a needless burden to be resisted, or a tradition
and culture to be restored, cannot be resolved here.  The challenge is to
identify a model in which the practices of practitioners and scholars serve as
complements to one another, rather than affronts.  It is a challenge and a
debate that deserves an airing, along with fuller exploration of its implications.
One might, for example, question my implicit conceptual linkage between the
institutions of the law and those of higher education.  As Lawrence Friedman
notes, the Langdellian law school emerged from the effort to both situate law
schools within the university but segregate the law from other academic
disciplines.89  Yet the contemporary version of that law school, with specialty
programs, clinics, and scholars writing in a profusion of new and traditional
modes, sounds strikingly like both the larger eclectic university of which it is
usually a part, and the extraordinary diverse profession in general.90  Eugene
Volokh’s Academic Legal Writing should certainly help teach law students to
write better papers; it may set some lawyers (and law professors) on the path
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to becoming more thoughtful professionals.  May it also contribute to ongoing
dialogues about the character of legal education, and of the legal profession.
